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RETURN OF PROPERTY SEIZED DURING WORLD WAR I:
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS UNDER
THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
"The concern of the Trading with the Enemy Act is with problems
at once complicated and far-reaching in their repercussions. Instead




342 U.S. 308,319 (1952).
THE Trading with the Enemy Act 1 authorizes government seizure, in
time of war 2 or national emergency, 3 of all foreign owned or controlled prop-
erty located in the United States.4 During World War II 5 the Alien Prop-
1. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. §§ 1-40 (Supp. 1952). For a general
discussion of the Act, see DOMKE, TRADING WITH Tim ENEMY IN WORLD WAR II
(1943); Symposium, Enemy Property, 11 LAW & CONT=mP. PaOn, 1 (1945). For a
comparative survey of comparable legislation in other belligerent nations, see Do,
op. sit. supra; Carroll, Legislation on Treatment of Enemy Property, 37 Am. J. INT'L L.
611 (1943).
2. Duration of "war" for the purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act is dis-
cussed in note 5 infra.
3. National emergencies were proclaimed by the President before the United States
entered World War II, Proc. No. 2487, 55 STAT. 1647 (1941), and after the Chinese
entry into the Korean conflict, Proc. No. 2914, 64 STAT. A454 (1950), activating the pro-
visions of the Trading with the Enemy Act. See Note, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 110 (1951).
4. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 5(b) (1946). Title and pos-
session of property are acquired by a vesting order issued by the Office of Alien Property.
REPORT OF OFFICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY 19-20 (1943) (hereinafter cited as REP. OAP).
Possession of property may also be acquired without issuance of a vesting order where
the holder turns it over to the Office for "safekeeping." Id. at 36 (1946)'. And, some
properties may be supervised by order of the Office of Alien Property, although title and
possession remain in the private owner. Id. at 50-2 (1943).
The Act was passed and first employed in World War I. See GAriINGS, INTE=fA-
TIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN EN aY PROPERTY 60-86 (1940).
Prior to World War I, there was considerable historical precedent for United States
seizure of enemy property. For maritime prize law authorizing seizure of privately-
owned enemy ships, see, e.g., The Venus, 8 Cranch 253 (U.S. 1814) (War of 1812) ; The
Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231 (U.S. 1865) (Civil War); The Benito Estinger, 176 U.S. 569
(1900) (Spanish-American War). For seizures of realty and personalty during the
Revolutionary War and the Civil War, see GATHiNGS, op. cit. supra, at 15-29, 35-45.
5. War was declared against Japan on December 8, 1941, 55 STAT. 795; Germany and
Italy on December 11, 1941, 55 STAT. 796, 797; Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania on June
5, 1942, 56 STAT. 307. Until exchange of peace treaty ratifications or a prior Presidential
proclamation, a war has not ended, 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U.S.C. APr. § 2 (1946), and
property can be vested. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923) ; Orme v.
Northern Trust Co., 410 Ill. 354, 102 N.E.2d 335 (1951), cert. denied sub no,. Von
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erty Custodian,6 acting under presidential authority,7 e:,ercised this power
to vest title to foreign assets worth over 500 million dollars and to additional
thousands of patent and copyright interests. s The.e seizures were limite;-l
to property allegedly owned or controlled by enemies and non-enemies subject
to enemy occupation. 9 Seizure of enemy property was designed to facilitate
its use in American war production, and preclude its use for enemy purpose:.")
And, where property was owned by residents of non-enemy nations under enemy
occupation, vesting also served to protect the former owners' interests."1
The exigencies of modern economic warfare sanctioned peremptory . eizures;
divested owners, including American citizens and residents, had little oppor-
tunity to challenge the Custodian's authority to vest their property. 12
Hardenburg v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 921 (1952). While hostilit:es of World War II have
officially ceased, 12 FED. REG. 1 (1947), the resolution t .rminating the state of % ar li-
tween the United States and Germany, Jt. Res. 289, 65 ST.xv. 451 (1951), a'd the pmce
treaties with Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary reserved the right of the
United States to vest property. Mauer, Protection of Non-Enc;ny I t:crests in Enwmy
External Assets, 16 LAw & CoN=rP. PuoB. 407, 409 (1951) (Italy, Runianh, Bulgaria,
and Hungary); Pub. L. No. 181, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) (Japan). Lut th-e Cust-dian
limits the current vesting program to Japanese-o,vned property l crtcd in the Lait .l
States on or prior to December 31, 1946. REP. OAP 1-2 (1951l). A siwilar vc-ting pro-
gram was pursued with respect to German-owned property until April 17, VW53. cN.Y.
Times, April 18, 1953, p. 3, col. 5.
6. While the Custodian was in charge of the Alien Proi erty program duripg World
War I and part of World War II, an Assistant Attorney General of the D.partment of
Justice, called the Director of the Office of Alien Prcpcrty, now heads the program.
REP. OAP iv (1951). The official in charge of the program will hereinaftr L. rierrCd
to as the "Custodian." A litigant, however, must keep in step with pzrsoi nl change3 or face
the dismissal of his complaint. Tc, shio Joji v. Clark, 11 F.R.D° 253 (X.D. Calif. P5i)
(failure to amend complaint after new Attorney G.ncral was appointcd).
7. 40 STAT. 415 (1917), 50 U.S.C. Arr. § 6 (1946) ; Exec. Order No. (j05, 7 Fu. Rr..
1971 (1942), as amended, Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 FED. RE,;. 5205 (1942 1.
S. The $500,000,00 in vested foreign assets includes property v:ith ascertainable
value, such as interests in business enterprises, royalties, realty, and personalty, estates awl
trusts. REr. OAP 2 (1951). Vested, but not subject to a mondary evaluation, were more
than 40,000 patents and patent interests. Id. at 45, 47. Copyrights on "0t,00 foreign
works and the foreign interests in an additional 550 prewar copyright contracts covering
thousands of works .. " were vested. Id. at 50, 52-3. And approximately ,0U trademarl
interests were also vested.
9. REP. OAP 16-7 (1943). The Custodian "rarely"' vested prof erty of nationals uf
enemy-occupied countries "except patents and copyrights:" Id. at 0 (11,44). For a list
of the 20 countries affected by this restricted vesting policy, see Table 2", id. at 5S (1947).
The Custodian occasionally vested property of internees, repatriates, and neutrals on
the Proclaimed List ("blacklist"). Id. at 7-9 (1944).
10. Bishop, Judicial Construction of the Trading with the Encwy Act, 62 HAnv. L. -nv.
721 (1949); Markham, 2Iaking Enemy Moncey Fight For Us, American Magazine, Oct.
1944, p. 24; REP. OAP 12-13 (1943).
11. Rue'. OAP 17 (1943).
12. "W7ar brooks no delay. The Constitution imposes none." Silesian-Anmerican Corp.
v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 477 (1947). Also see Central Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Garvan, 254
U.S. 554 (1921). If property is not voluntarily turned over to the Custodian when a
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Former owners, however, are protected to the extent that the Act allows 1,1
them to seek return of their property.14 The Fifth Amendment,'" prohibiting
confiscation of property without compensation, compels return of property
or compensation to alien and American friends,'; but not to enemies. 17 In
contrast to post-World War I policy,'5 Congress has yet to go beyond this
vesting order is issued, he can enforce the order in any federal district court. 40 STAT.
425 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 17 (1946). And, the holder of the property cannot contest
the seizure on the grounds: that the owner is not an enemy, Commercial Trust Co.
v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923) ; or that the enemy's interest was voided under the state law
when federal law guaranteed such an interest, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) ; or
that the enemy's interest violated a federal law, In rc Sutherland, 21 F.2d 667 (W.D.N.Y.
1927). But see McGrath v. Dravo Corp., 183 F.2d 709 (3d Cir. 1950) (Custodian stands in
enemy's "shoes" and cannot vest what does not exist in the enemy's account) ; McGrath v.
Ward, 91 F. Supp. 636 (D. Mass. 1950) (if enemy beneficiary could not claim trust proceeds,
the Custodian cannot). For discussion of whether there is an enemy interest, see Notes, 37
CORNELL L.Q. 110 (1951), 35 GEo. L.J. 262 (1947).
13. The Act's provisions are the claimant's "sole relief and remedy" for any action
with respect to vested property. 40 STAT. 1020, 1021 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 7(c) (1946).
Actions for relief not based on the Act are dismissed for lack of the sovereign's consent.
See, e.g., Von Bruning v. Sutherland, 29 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (for rent and damages) ;
Duisberg v. United States, 89 F. Supp. 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (for just compensation under
Tucker Act) ; Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) (claim for an accounting
dismissed). Cf. N. V. Montan Export-Metaal Handel-Maatschappij v. United States, 102
F. Supp. 1016 (Ct. Cf. 1952) (patent infringement suit dismissed) ; Iwazo Yamashita v.
Clark, 75 F. Supp. 51, 54-5 (D. Hawaii 1948) (specific performance). But cf. Polaroid
Corp. v. Markham, 148 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (patent suit for prior invention allowed).
14. See 40 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U.S.C. Arp. § 9(a) (1946), and 60 STAT. 50 (1946),
as amended, 50 U.S.C. Apr. § 32 (Supp. 1952). If the property has been sold, the eligible
claimant can seek return of the net proceeds. 40 STAT. 1020 (1917), 50 U.S.C. APp. § 7(c)
(1946) ; 60 STAT. 50 (1946), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(a) (Supp. 1952). Under
§ 9(a), return of property or net proceeds includes appreciations during the period of
Government ownership, Henkels v. Sutherland, 271 U.S. 298 <1926). And Government
expenses are deductible under § 9(a) only if incurred in seizing and maintaining the
property. Escher v. Woods, 281 U.S. 379 (1930) (Office of Alien Property's overhead
expenses not allowed) ; Vowinckel v. Sutherland, 24 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1928) (Govern-
ment litigation expenses in opposing return of vested property not deductible). But, returns
under § 32 need not include increment in the value of property during period of Govern-
ment ownership. See Letter to Custodian from President T.-uman, dated May 16, 1946,
copy on file in Yale Law Library. For expenses that are deductible from § 32 returns,
see 60 STAT. 53-4, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(g) (1946).
15. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. V.
16. See Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 318 (1952) ; Russian Volunteer Fleet
v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-2 (1931).
17. "Unquestionably to wage war successfully, the United States may confiscate
enemy property." Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475 (1947). Also see
Cummings v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115 (1937) ; Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 268
(U.S. 1871).
18. 41 STAT. 977 (1920), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(b)-(q) (1946). German
former owners were only allowed to recover up to 80 percent of seized property. GATII-
iNGs, op. cit. supra note 4, at 315. Such returns, however, were discontinued in 1934 when
Germany defaulted on payment of American war claims. 48 STAT. 1267 (1934), Cummings
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constitutional requirement by making all former owners eligible for return.
Generally, while non-enemies are eligible for return, property formerly owned
by enemies is being sold 19 or licensed 20 to American industry and the pro-
ceeds retained by the Government. This policy of confiscation was primarily
designed to sterilize the future war-making potential of former enemy na-
tions 21 and to provide funds for the satisfaction of American war claims. -
But the postwar period has seen a tempering of the policy of confiscation.2 3
v. Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115 (1937). Settlement of Germany's World War I obligations
has recently been reached and now awaits ratification. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1953, p. 31,
col. 1.
Property seized during World War I and still retained has a book -alue of $60,164,876.18.
REP. OAP 17 (1951). But, with the exception of $2,000,000 in cash, the property consists
of unmarketable securities. Interim Rep., Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary
to Investigate the Administration of the Trading uith the Enemy Act, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
79 (1953).
19. 62 STAT. 1246 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 39 (Supp. 1952). For the sales procedure,
see 40 STAT. 460 (1918), 50 U.S.C. A. § 12 (1946) ; REP. OAP 28-9 (1951) ; Eisner,
Administrative Machiner, and Steps for the Lauver. 11 LANw & Co.r-. Przou. 61, 69
(1945). Sales of vested trademarks are based on a policy of preventing consumer deception.
REt. OAP, supra at 55. WVhen vested corporate securities in specified "key" corporations
are sold, the buyer and all future owners must be "American Nationals." 8 Coi,. FED.
RnGs. § 505.10-12 (1953); PROSPECTus OF AmERicAx Boscu CoPP. 14-16 (June 15, 1948).
20. Patents are licensed rather than sold to American industry. Sargeant & Creamer,
Enemy Patents, 11 LAw & CONTE-P. PROB. 92 (1945). For the patent licensing policy, see
Rm. OAP 45-9 (1951). For criticism of the policy, see Borchard, Nationalization of
Enemy Patents, 37 Amx. J. INT'L L. 92 (1943) (proposing compensation to the former enemy
owners) ; Gearhart, Post-lVar Prospects for Treatment of Enemy Properly, 11 Lkw &
Coi rE-P. PRoR. 183, 197 (1945) (sell rather than license patents). Copyrights are also
licensed. REP. OAP 50-3 (1951); German Technological Books and the Offce of Alien
Property, 158 PUBLISH-a'S WE.EKLY 850, 851 (1950) (reporting German criticism of
licensees' postwar sales in Germany).
21. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs on S. Res.
107 and S. Res. 146, pt. III, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 61-3 (1945). For the role of German
"private" interests in furthering German military goals, see Hearings, supra. pL III at
454-64; pt IV, 992-1002.
M2. War Claims Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 1240 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 2001-
13 (Supp. 1952); 'Mason, Relationship of War Claims to V'ested Assets, 1a LA% &
CoxrzmP. PRoR. 395 (1951). An estimated '$20,000,000 will be necessary to satisfy American
war claims, and the Custodian has already transferred $150,000,000 to the War Claims
Fund. Smi-AxN. REP. WaR CLLms Comm'N 16-17 (Sept. 1952). For conflicting viets
on the morality of using private property for war claims, compare Borchard, The Trcatment
of Enemy Property, 34 GEo. L.J. 389 (1946), with Rubin, "Inviolability" of Enemy
Private Property, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 166 (1945). For discussion of an interna-
tional agreement to settle intercustodial conflicts for an equitable resolution of war claims,
see Mason, Conflicting Claims to German External Assets, 33 GEO. L.J. 171 (1950).
23. "After hostilities have ceased there is always, and should be, a period of re-
capitulation and reappraisement. The harsh and total methods of seizure during the war
are weighed in light of the new atmosphere. Inequities are always found to have been
done, so that a balancing of interests must be made. We in the United States today are
in that national adjusting period." SEN. RE'. No. 572, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1951).
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Consequently, limited return has been promised to some former enemies 21
and Congress is considering the possibility of returns to still others.25
The Trading with the Enemy Act contains two provisions for return of
vested property: Section 32 for administrative proceedings before the Office
of Alien Property, not subject to judicial review, 20 and Section 9(a) for suits
in federal district courts. 27 The filing of a 9(a) suit enjoins the Custodian
from disposing of the property in issue.28 While filing of a Section 32 claim
does not enjoin the Custodian, he, nevertheless, has refrained from disposing
of property claimed.29 Sections 9(a) and 32 are procedurally independent.
A claimant eligible under both sections need not exhaust his administrative
remedy under Section 32 before bringing a 9(a) suit;BO nor are final de-
terminations or findings of fact in one proceeding binding in the other pro-
ceeding.31 In addition to this procedural independence, 9(a) and 32, while
24. See note 85 infra.
25. Pending legislation would permit return of property to all former owners except
Nazis and Communists, if such property was acquired by gift, devise, bequest, or inheritance
from an American citizen, S. 151, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953); and permit return of
trust fund benefits to "enemies" if the trust was created by an American citizen, S. 249,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
26. 60 STAT. 50 (1946), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32 (Supp. 1952), McGrath v.
Zander, 177 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1949). For the regulations governing § 32 admiistra-
tive determinations, see 8 CODE FE. REGs. § 502 (1953). Prior to the enactment of § 3Z,
claims for administrative return of property were handled under § 9(a). For a compilation
of sample administrative determinations under § 9(a), see FINAL, DTELJMINATIONS
OF TiE VEsTED PROPErY CI.AIms Comix~rER (1946) (hereinafter cited as FINAL
DaTRmiNATiONs).
27. 40 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U.S.C. AiP. § 9(a) (1946), Esther v. Woods, 281 U.S.
379 (1930).
28. 40 STAT. 420 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(a) (1946). The injunction feature of
9(e) has two adverse effects. First, it deteriorates the economic and competitive status
of an affected business enterprise which may be kept for many years in the limbo between
present government ownership and eventual private enterprise. See, e.g., MINUTI's OF
THE ANNUAL MEETING OF GENERAL ANILINE & FiLm STOCKHoLDERs 28-30 (April 22,1952).
Second, the Custodian will be delayed in returning property to the rightful claimant if a
"blackmailing" litigant has commenced a nuisance suit under 9(a). See SEN. RaP No. 59,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
A recently filed bill in Congress would allow the sale of Government-owned enterprises,
and the proceeds from the sale would be kept in a special account until the 9(a) suit was
settled or until conflicting claimants had reached a compromise. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1953,
p. 37, col. 7.
29. REP. OAP 4 (1951). Since this refusal to dispose is voluntary on the part of
the Custodian, the adverse effects of an injunction, see note 28 supra, can be avoided.
30. See Blank v. Clark, 79 F. Supp. 373, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (Plaintiff instituted 9(a)
suit before final determination of § 32 claim).
31. See McGrath v. Zander, 177 F.2d 649, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (residence require-
ments in 9(a) and 32 may be subject to different interpretations). But determinations
[Vol. 62:12101214
93RETURN OF PROPERTY
sharing some common substantive requirements, contain others which are
distinctive.
REQUIREMENTS FOR RETURN OF VESTED PROPERTY
Ownership of a Proprietary Interest at the Time of Vesting
Both 9(a) and 32 require that the claimant establish, as of the time im-
mediately prior to seizure, his ownership of a proprietary interest in the
property. Similar statutory language in 9(a) and 32 forms the basis of the
proprietary interest concept. Section 9(a) allows return of an "interest,
right or title in" the vested property;302 and Section 32 permits recovery of
"any property or interest vested" by the Custodian.1 Courts under 9(a)
and the Custodian under Section 32 have generally construed this concept
narrowly. For example, the requisite proprietary interest has not been found
in rights arising out of an executory contract 3 4 or interests of speculative
pecuniary value, such as remote contingent remainders.33 Creditors with debt
claims against former owners of vested property are held to lack a proprietary
interest in that property.?16 While language in 9(a) still provides for debt
claims, 37 Section 34,38 enacted in 1946, has been held to pre-empt 9(a)'s jurisdic-
tion.39 Section 34 provides for a pro rata distribution of available proceeds to
made in § 9(a) administrative proceedings, see note 26 stupra, may be "precedents for the
allowance or disallowance of claims [under § 32]. , FiN.%L DE Ta ' n-,rTio,.s i (1946).
32. 40 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(a) (1946).
33. 60 STAT. 50, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(a) (1946).
34. See, e.g., Albert v. McGrath, 104 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1952) ; In the Matter of
"Colos" International Company, Claim No. 1112, FINAL D'ra_-z4NATz0Ns 46 (1946). Bt
cf. Standard Oil Company v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917, 930 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. deicd, 333
U.S. 873 (1948) (contractual rights to exploit patents considered a proprietary interest
because of their "substantial nature and their great monetary value.").
Claims have also been denied when the plaintiff relied on a "gentlemn's agreement,"
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Societe, etc., 189 F2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1951), or when the plain-
tiff defaulted on the contract, Ixwazo Yamashita v. Clark, 75 F. Supp. 51 (D. Hawaii 1948).
35. Koehler v. Clark, 170 F2d 779 (9th Cir. 1943) (claimant had "an inalienable
and unsalable possible expectancy") ; cf. In the Matter of H. C. Biering, Claim No. 1377,
FINAL DETaxIIATIO,-zS 24, 30 (1946) (claimant had a mere "expectation").
36. See, e.g., Cabell v. Clark, 162 F2d 153 (2d Cir. 1947) ; In the Matter of NV. Sa.tin
Seward, Claim No. 1600, FIN%.L DErmzNATIOxS 144 (1946); REP. OAP 69 (1951).
Secured creditors can recover under §§ 9(a) or 32 if their liens are held to constitute
an "interest in" the debtor's property. Comnpare Briesen v. A Certain Fund, 3 F2d 509
(D.C. Cir. 1925) (trustee's lien is a proprietary interest), and REP. OAP, srpra, uith Blank
v. Clark, 79 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1948) ("charging lien" merely establishes priority of
payment), and Richmers Rhederei, A. G. v. Sutherland, 23 F.2d 989 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 276 U.S. 632 (1928) (shipper's freight lien establishes no "ow'nership" in the
property).
37. 40 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U.S.C. Ap,. § 9(a) (1946); 41 STAT. 977 (1920), S0
U.S.C. App. § 9(e) (1946), Markham v. Cabell, 2o U.S. 404 (1945).
38. 60 STAT. 925, 50 U.S.C. App. § 34 (1946).
39. Orvis v. Browuell, 345 U.S. 183 (1953) ; Cabell v. Clark, 10 F2d 153 (2d Cir.
1947).
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creditors, 40 while 9(a) would pay claimants on a first-come-first-served basis.
41
Consequently, courts may be prone to call doubtful claims "debts" rather than
an "interest in" property.4 2 For example, a limited partner, admittedly not a
creditor of the partnership under state law, was nevertheless held to be a
creditor who lacked a proprietary interest "in" his share of the firm's assets,
48
In addition to establishing proprietary interests, claimants must prove
ownership of such interests at the date of vesting.44 Claims of ownership
are frequently based on pre-war transfers from enemies. 46 Beginning in 1940,
transfers of most foreign owned property in the United States were gradually
made subject to Treasury Department licensing regulations; unlicensed trans-
fers were null and void. 46 To recover vested property transferred before
licensing regulations were in effect, claimants must prove that such transfers
were legally effective. This is governed by such traditional requirements of
contract or gift law as a "meeting of the minds"47 or donative intent. 48 These
40. 60 STAT. 925, 50 U.S.C. App. § 34(d), (g) (1946). But, § 34 is available only
to United States or Philippine citizens or United States residents. 60 STAT. 925, 50
U.S.C. App. § 34(a) (1946). For reasons for denying relief to foreign creditors, see H.R.
REP,. No. 2398, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1946).
Despite these limitations, the Office of Alien Property is "overwhelmed" by the 43,457
pending debt claims, which seek over $1,800,000,000, Interim Rep., supra note 18, at 5, 8.
An Office spokesman recently requested that the § 34 remedy be closed to nearly $1,000,000,-
000 in claims which were payable in foreign currencies when the debts were incurred.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1953, p. 12, col. 2. A previous bill to foreclose § 34 to debt claims
on corporate and Government bonds issued by enemies was not enacted. H.R. 8502, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
41. See Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 405, 410 (1945).
42. See, e.g., Alley v. Clark, 71 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
43. Alley v. Clark, supra note 42. This conceptual morass leads courts to define a
proprietary interest by legal conclusions rather than operative facts. Id. at 525, 526 2.1.
44. For 9(a) suits, see Berger v. Ruoff, 195 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied
sub nora. Berger v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 950 (1952) ; Corn Exchange Bank v. Miller, 15
F.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). For § 32, see 60 STAT. 50, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(a) (1) (1946).
45. See, e.g., Miller v. Herzfeld, 4 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1925) ; Corn Exchange Bank v.
Miller, mpra note 44. Transfers from enemies after the start of war are illegal and un-
recognized. See, e.g., Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 229 (D. Mass. 1920).
46. Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 FED. Rma. 1400 (1940), as finally amended, Exec, Order
No. 8998, 6 FED. Rm. 6785 (1941) ; Orvis v. Brownell, 345 U.S. 183 (1953) (state attach-
ment lien cannot transfer a proprietary interest); Blank v. Clark, 79 F. Supp. 373, 376
(E.D. Pa. 1948) (transfer of intestate successor's interest is void). But ef. Iwazo Yamashlita
v. Clark, 75 F. Supp. 51 (D. Hawaii 1948) (conditional sales contract not a "transfer").
See Reeves, The Control of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury, 11 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 17 (1945).
47. See, e.g., Beck v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1950). On the basis of the
same facts, courts and Custodian may not agree on whether or not the parties reached
a mutual agreement. Compare In the Matter of Herman A. Brassert, Claim No. 589,
FiNM. DE mFINATIONS 35, 43 (1946) (no mutual agreement), wilth Brassert v. Clark,
162 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1947) (mutual agreement).
48. See, e.g., Ebert v. Miller, 4 F.2d 296 (D.C. Cir. 1925), disnissed per stipulation
of counsel, 296 U.S. 666 (1926).
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subjective standards afford courts flexible tools to implement the policies of
the Act. For e-x-ample, in I'on Wedel v. McGrath,40 a German national had
utilized a power of attorney in an attempted gift of personalty located in the
United States to the plaintiff, his wife, who was a United States citizen and
resident. The power of attorney, in addition to authorizing commercial use,
gave the attorney-in-fact a general power to dispose of the property. Despite
a transfer by the attorney-in-fact to the wife prior to vesting, the Third Circuit
denied return in a 9(a) suit on the ground that the wife did not own the
personalty at the time of vesting. The court held that the transfer was in-
effective for lack of donative intent. 0 Relying on traditional agency doctrine,
it was held that the principal's intent must be found in the power of attorney. 1
And the court found that the gift was not intended by the general clause in
the instrument since its only specific provisions dealt with commercial utiliza-
tion of the property.5 2 While such restrictive construction may le necessary
to safeguard the grantor of a power of attorney in the ordinary commercial
context, it is inappropriate here because the enemy owner probably intended
a gift.53 But the decision may have been motivated by unstated judicial su-
spicion that gifts from enemies to American relatives are sham devices, and
that after the war such property will be returned to the enen donor.5
Enemies frequently employed "shan" transfers to conceal ownership of
property in the United States in order to avoid foreign taxes and exchange
laws,5 5 pre-war consumer boycotts, " ; and wartime confiscation.5 - These
49. 84 F. Supp. 299 (D.N.J. 1949). aff'd, 10 F.2d 716 (3d Cir.), ecri. deni:d, 340
U.S. 816 (1950), motion to amend complaint denied. 100 F. Supp. 434 (D.XJ. 1951).
50. Von Vedel v. McGrath, 180 F.2d 716, 718-9 (3d Cir. 1950).
51. Ibid. Accord, Kaname Fujino v. Clark, 71 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Hawaii 1947),
aff'd, 172 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937 (1949).
52. Von Wedel v. McGrath, 180 F.2d 716, 718-9 (3d Cir. 1950). Also see Kaname
Fujino v. Clark, 172 F.2d 384, 3,5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937 (1949) ; Miyukd
Olihara v. Clark, 71 F. Supp. 319, 322 (D. Hawaii 1947).
53. See Von Wedel v. McGrath, supra note 52 at 719 (concurring opinion); Miyuki
Okihara v. Clark, supra note 52, at 322.
54. For other cases that may be based on similar judicial fears, see, e.g., Kaname
Fujino v. Clark, 172 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937 (1949) (to son for
"one dollar and love and affection") ; Miyukd Okihara, 71 F. Supp. 319 (D. Haaii 1947)
(gift to niece). But see, Miller v. Herzfeld, 4 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1925) (three-word
radiogram three days after severance of diplomatic relations held a valid transfer from
enemy brother to plaintiff).
In the reverse situation-a gift from the non-enemy plaintiff to an enemy relative-the
transfer will be sustained, preventing return of the vested property to the non-enemy
plaintiff. See, e.g., In the Matter of Shinsaku Nagano, Claim No. 48, FiN.. DE'r-aix-
NATIOxS 126 (1946); In the Matter of Theodore Rings, Claim No. 820, F=wA. Da-
TrzasusxATioNs 140 (1946).
55. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on .1ilitary Affairs on S. Res.
107 and S. Res. 146, pt. III, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 580-2 (1945). See, e.g., Uebersee Finanz-
Korp., A. G. v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 205 (1952).
56. Hearings, supra note 55. See, e.g., Vort v. McGrath, 99 F. Supp. 57, 59 (D.D.C.
1951), affd per curiam, 199 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
57. Hearings, supra note 55. See, e.g., Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 (1921).
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"cloaking" arrangements were attempted by business firms rs as well as by
relatives and friends. Existence of agreements to reconvey property at the
end of the war 59 are apparent when enemy transferors retain options to re-
purchase. 60 But, generally, such understandings must be inferred from less
direct evidence. 6 ' For example, cloaked transactions have been found where
transferees acquired property for inadequate consideration 02 or without
reasonable business motives,6 3 or where transferors restricted transferees'
use of property. 4 Findings of cloaked transfers preclude return of vested
58. See, e.g., Feller v. McGrath, 106 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
59. Courts and the Custodian will find a "cloak" if the parties contemplated postwar
re-transfers to the enemy transferor. See, e.g., The Benito Estinger, 176 U.S. 568, 578
(1900) ; Kind v. Clark, 161 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1947) ; In the Matter of Paul Gutschow,
Claim No. 957, FINAL. DT RmaaNATIoNs 69 (1946) ("When danger passed, old [status
of parties is to be] re-established"). Cf. Second Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller, 268
U.S. 552 (1925).
Where the enemy transferor, but not the non-enemy transferee, intended postwar
reversion of the property, the transfer is ineffective as a "cloak," In the Matter of
Richard D. Heins, Claim No. 1962, FINAL DEMMINATIONS 86 (1946), or because the
parties had no "meeting of the minds." Beck v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1950).
60. See, e.g., Vort v. McGrath, 99 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd per citra,g,
199 F.2d 782(D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Beck v. McGrath, 182 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1950) ; In the
Matter of Paul Gutschow, Claim No. 957, FINAL DERvmmi ATrONs 69 (1946). Blit cf.
Matheson v. Hicks, 10 F.2d 872, 883 (E.D.N.Y. 1926).
Termination of an option agreement may not remove the suspicion that the original
transfer was a "cloak." Vort v. McGrath, supra at 62.
61. In Feller v. McGrath, 106 F. Supp. 147, 151 (W.D. Pa. 1952), the court said:
"There is no direct evidence that this agreement to conceal was entered
into at a specific time and place, or that it was written or verbal, but the
existence of such agreement is to be inferred from the testimony of plaintiff,
from his negotiations [with the enemy], from the contracts between the
parties, the actions and reactions of the plaintiff and the [enemy] from
1927 through 1939, and from the circumstances."
Accord, Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917, 923 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. delied,
333 U.S. 873 (1948). For ingenious devices to conceal enemy ownership, see Reeves,
The Coontrol of Foreign Funds by the United States Treasury, 11 LAW & CoN'tE .
PaoB. 17, 52 et seq. (1945) ; Hearings, supra note 55, at 583.
62. See, e.g., Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 248 (1921) ($5,000 "down" for
$5,000,000, in securities). In commercial contexts a cloaked transfer is obvious if the
transferee gave no consideration. Vort v. McGrath, 99 F. Supp. 57, 60-1 (D.D.C. 1951),
affd per curiam, 199 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (transferees, with consent of transferor,
used transferor's money to "purchase" property from him); In the Matter of Paul
Gutschow, Claim No. 957, FINAL DFm-UaNATioNs 69 (1946) (same). Where considera-
tion was lacking, return is sometimes denied, not on the grounds that the transfer was
"cloaked," but because the transferee was an agent of the enemy transferor. In the
Matter of C. Martin Riedel, Claims No. 130, 815, 1332, id. 136; In the Matter of Arnold
Weisselberg, Claims No. 870, 1209, id. 166.
63. See Stoehr v. Wallace, supra note 62, at 251; Kind v. Clark, 161 F.2d 36, 45 (2d
Cir. 1947).
64. See, e.g., Vort v. McGrath, 99 F. Supp. 57, 60 (D.D.C. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 199
F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (restrictions on dividends and resale) ; Feller v. McGrath, 10
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property to claimants on the ground that they lacked complete ownership of
the property. 5 Courts and Custodian hold that such claimants received only
bare legal title and that the enemy transferor retained beneficial ownaership. C
It is doubtful that courts would find such beneficial ownership if the enemy
transferor sought post-war enforcement of an agreement to reconvey property.
Such agreements are probably unenforceable in American courts as repug-
nant to public policy or on the theory that they were terminated by the out-
break of war.6 7 However, such agreements may nevertheless be voluntarily
effectuated by the parties or, if jurisdiction is obtainable, enforced in a foreign
forum. 3 By denying return to the claimant-transferee such future occurrences
are precluded.
Eligibility of Former Owners
Unlike their similar treatment of the proprietary interest test, Sections 9(a)
and 32 employ different criteria for determining whether a claimant is person-
ally eligible for return.
Section 9(a) requires a plaintiff to prove J9 that lie was not an "enemy" or
"ally of [an] enemy" when his property was vested. 70 In addition to certain
categories of foreign corporations, the Act defines an "enemy" or "ally of
[an] enemy" as: (1) the government of any nation (e.g., Germany) with
which the United States was at war or that of any nation (e.g., Finlandj
allied with such nations; (2) individuals who resided within the confines of
F. Supp. 147, 153 (W.D. Pa. 1952) (control of personnel as well as stock voting and
issuance); Kaname Fujino v. Clark, 172 F2d 334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937
(1949) (enemy's attorneys operated the property).
65. The Custodian will deny return if the real ownership of the property was
"cloaked" at "any time after September 1, 1939." 60 STr.%. 50, 50 U.S.C. As. § 32(a)
(3) (1946). Courts will deny return if the enemy's interest enistcd at the time of
vesting. Kaname Fujino v. Clark, 172 F.2d 384, 385 (9th Cir.), cert. de:icd, 337 U.S.
937 (1949).
66. See, e.g., Kaname Fujino v Clark, 172 F.2d 384, 385 (9th Cir.j, cert. dcnicd,
337 U.S. 937 (1949); In the 'latter of Richard D. Heins, Claim No. 1962, F:Au. D.-
TERmINATos 86 (1946). Congressional definition of a "cloak" is that the "real owner"
is an enemy. 91 CoNG. REc. 11361 (1945).
67. See Matheson v. Hicks, 10 F.2d 872, S83 (E.D.N.Y. 192b).
68. E.g., Swiss courts allegedly refuse to recognize or give effect to decisions made
under "trading-with-the-enemy" legislation. Brief for Respondent, p. ol n.33, Uebersee-
Finanz Korp., A.G. v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 205 (1952).
69. The claimant must come forward with a "preponderance" of proof. Draeger
Shipping Co. v. Crowley, 55 F. Supp. 906, 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); Sturchler v. Hicks,
17 F.2d 321, 324 (E.D.N.Y. 1926).
70. 40 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 9(a) (1946). "Enemy" or "non-enemy"
status is fixed at the time of vesting. Buddenberg v. Sutherland, 15 F2d 605 (D.C. Cir.
1926); Kotohira Jinsha v. McGrath, 90 F. Supp. 892 (D. Havaii 190); Hearings
before Committee on the Judiciary on HR. 50S9, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1946). Status
is not changed by the end of the war or American occupation of enemy nations. Swiss
Nat Ins. Co. v. Alier, 267 U.S. 42 (1925); Feyerabend v. McGrath, 139 F.2d 694
(D.C. Cir. 1951).
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these nations or territories (e.g., Belgium) occupied by them: and (3) non-
residents of the United States (e.g., Swiss corporations) who did business in
such nations or territories after the United States declared war.7 '
"Residence" has probably been the most frequently used test for determin-
ing "enemy" character. Residence under the Act, described as "something
more than physical presence and something less than domicile,"7 2 constitutes
actual presence in a particular territory coupled with intent to reside there.t
Where sojourners are involuntarily detained in enemy or enemy-occupied
territory, there is clearly no intent to reside. 74 But in most cases the existence
of intent is less obvious,75 allowing courts wide leeway in implementing the
policies underlying the Act. For example, in Josephberg v. Markham,70 the
Second Circuit held that Alfred Cerutti was not an enemy resident, although
he left this country and remained in Italy since 1931, voting there, attempting
71. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2(a), (b) (1946). The category of
"enemy" and "ally of an enemy" may include: "Such other individuals, or body or
class of individuals, as may be natives, citizens, or subjects of any nation with which
the United States is at war [or of any nation allied with such nations], other than
citizens of the United States, wherever resident or wherever doing business, as the
President, if he shall find the safety of the United States or the successful prosecution
of the war shall so require, may, by proclamation, include within the term 'enemy.' "
Id. § 2(c). The President has never exercised this power. See Iwazo Yamashita v.
Clark, 75 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Hawaii 1948).
During World War II, Finland was the sole independent nation which was an "ally
of an enemy." However, no Finnish property was vested. Hearings before Commwsittee
on the Judiciary on H.R. 3750, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1945).
72. Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 312 (1952).
73. Ibid. The standards of residency in other legal contexts are not binding,
Vowinckel v. First Federal Trust Co., 10 F2d 19, 21 (9th Cir. 1926), nor is the
standard of residency used by the Custodian under § 32, McGrath v. Zander, 177 F.2d
649, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
74. See, e.g., Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1926).
75. The weight courts give to any particular indicia of "enemy residence" varies
from case to case. For example: (1) Tenure of the claimant's presence in enemy territory
before United States entry into the war, compare Lippman v. McGrath, 94 F. Supp.
1016 (S.D. Ill. 1950) (residency after seven years), with Kaku Nagano v. McGrath, 187
F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1951) (no residency after seventeen years) ; (2) retention of United
States citizenship by claimant, compare Feyerabend v. McGrath, 189 F.2d 694 (D.C.
Cir. 1951) (enemy residency), with McGrath v. Zander, 177 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(retained United States residency) ; (3) the claimant's voting behavior, compare Sarthou
v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (return to the United States to vote in 1940
indicated retention of United States residency), with Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F.2d
642 (2d Cir. 1945) (voting in Italian election did not indicate enemy residency); (4)
realty purchases, compare Sarthou v. Clark, supra (retained United States residency
despite purchase of home in Germany), with Lippman v. McGrath, supra (realty pur-
chase in United States did not indicate retention of United States residency) ; (5) assist-
ance to American military forces, compare McGrath v. Zander, supra (retained United
States residency), with Lippman v. McGrath supra (enemy residency).
76. 152 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1945), 55 YAz. L.J. 836 (1946).
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to purchase a villa, and sympathizing with the Fascist regime.
77 Because
Cerutti was mentally incompetent, the court held that he could not have had
the prerequisite intent to change his residence from the United States to
Italy.78 The decision was apparently influenced by the fact that Cerutti's
vested property, consisting of cash and securities, would be negligible in
increasing American war production. 7  Moreover, there was little danger,
according to the court, that Cerutti's presence in Italy would make his prop-
erty available for enemy use; it had been in the custody of a state court prior
to vesting8 0
While courts can sometimes manipulate the residency test to grant return,
they often cannot prevent this test from branding an individual as an
"enemy," although he is not an "enemy-in-fact." Since enemy territory in-
dudes enemy-occupied nations, residents of countries such as France, The
Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, and Denmark, are enemies for purposes of
Section 9(a). In the same category are residents of enemy nations who
were victims of racial, religious, or political persecution. Although not ene-
mies-in-fact, these individuals would not be eligible for recovery of vested
property under 9(a). 1 To remedy this situation, Congress enacted Section
32,82 which makes them eligible for administrative return.83 Section 32 was
also designed to permit return to other groups, ineligible under 9(a), whom
77. 152 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1945).
78. Ibid. Also see In re Viscomi's Estate, 183 Misc. 374, 379, 53 N.Y.S.2 416,
421 (1944).
79. See, Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F.2d 644, 643 (2d Cir. 1945). If this nere
a valid reason, it would justify return of all of the $71,000,000 of vested property that
consisted of bank accounts, cash and securities. REP. OAP 2 (1951). But, return of such
bank accounts, cash and securities would seriously deplete the amount available for .%ar
claims. See note 22 supra.
80. See Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F.2d 644, 648 (2d Cir. 1945). Also see
In re Viscomi's Estate, 183 Misc. 374, 53 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1944).
Joseplberg was further motivated by the fact that federal "freezing" regulations, con-
trolling most transactions involving American property owned by subjects of foreign
countries, prevented enemy use of Cerutti's property. 152 F2d 644, 643 (2d Cir. 1945).
But this argument would justify return of all vested property owvned by subjects of
foreign countries. For sources on "freezing" regulations, see note 46 supra.
81. H.R. REP. No. 1269, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). See, e.g., Public Admini-
strator of N.Y. County v. McGrath, 104 F. Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Latvian D.P.).
82. 60 STAT. 50, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32 (1946).
83. See H.R. REP. No. 1269, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). Residents of enemy-
occupied countries were made eligible in the original enactment of § 32. 60 STAT. 10,
50 U.S.C. App. § 32 (1946). German as well as other European persecutees were sub-
sequently made eligible. 60 STAT. 930, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(a) (2) (C), (D) (1946).
Groups only temporarily in the enemy's disfavor, e.g., Rumanian Iron Guard, are not
eligible. Ibid. See H.R. Ra. No. 23S9, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946). The attempt to
return property to persecutees has failed to the extent that enemy persecution often re-
sulted in mass extermination of former owners and heirs. Ser;. RUT. No. 6)0, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1951).
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Congress deemed worthy of return: certain non-resident American citizens,,,
Austrians, and Italians. 85 In addition, Section 32 was made available to former
owners already eligible for 9(a) return.86
The National Interest Test
In creating Section 32 for newly eligible groups of former owners, Congress
introduced a major substantive distinction between recovery under Sections
32 and 9(a). Section 32 initiated the requirement that a return of vested
property be "in the interest of the United States."817 Congress designed the
national interest test to bar return of vested property to a foreign claimant
whose government failed to grant reciprocal treatment to American citizens,
and "in doubtful cases."' 88 "Doubtful cases" apparently referred to claimants
whose wartime sympathies were suspect.8 9 But executive action soon ex-
panded the concept of national interest. In delegating his Section 32 powers
to the Custodian, the President requested that determinations of return should
include consideration of national security, foreign relations, financial and
fiscal policies, and commercial and antitrust policies. 90 Accordingly, the
84. Congress amended § 32 to permit return to American citizens resident in enemy
countries, including those who lost their American citizenship by marriage but subse-
quently reacquired it by Sept. 29, 1950. 64 STAT. 1080 (1950), 50 U.S.C. Apr. § 32(a)
(2) (D) (Supp. 1952). See H.R. RzEi. No. 3095, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
85. Under the Custodian's interpretation, Austrians are eligible for return. Rzi,.
OAP 13 n.1, 44 n.1 (1951); id. at 69 (1950). Pursuant to peace treaty promises,
Italians were made eligible for § 32 return. 61 STAT. 784 (1947), 50 U.S.C. Ap,. § 32(a)
(2) (Supp. 1952).
Similar promises for Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary were never fulfilled, and the
ultimate disposition of their property is still pending. REP. OAP 6 (1951). Neither
Congress nor public opinion would be amenable to returning property to residents of
nations behind the "Iron Curtain." See, e.g., Letter, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1952, p. 26,
col. 6 (suggestion that vested Hungarian property be used to reimburse the United States
for "ransom" paid to secure the release of American airmen).
86. Section 32 grants return to all former owners except those specifically barred,
60 STAT. 50, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(a) (2) (1946); and no claimant eligible under § 9(a)
is included in any of the groups proscribed by § 32. For a possible exception because of
judicial expansion of 9(a) eligibility to include shareholders in neutral corporations,
see pp. 1228-32 infra.
87. 60 STAT. 50, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(a) (5) (1946). Prior to the enactment of § 32,
the Office of Alien Property, in granting 9(a) administrative returns, see note 26 supra,
occasionally declared that it was not in the "national interest" to continue to treat the
claimant as an enemy. See, e.g., In the Matter of George Yamaoka, Claim No. 573,
FiNAL DETERmINATIONS 172, 176 (1946). But this phrase was gratuitous, since the
claimant, not an enemy under the Act's definition, was statutorily eligible for 9(a)
return.
88. H.R. REP. No. 1269, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1945).
89. Except where they mentioned the national interest test as a requirement to assure
reciprocal treatment, ibid., Congressmen spoke of this test as a bar to administrative
returns to claimants who were "cloaks" or associated with the enemy cause. 91 CoNa.
Rrc 11358-9 (1945).
90. Letter from President Truman to James E. Markham, May 16, 1946, copy on file
in Yale Law Library.
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Custodian established procedures for consulting with affected governmental
agencies, including the War, Navy, State, Treasury, and Justice Depart-
ments.91
The national interest test has been invoked at least nine times to deny,
delay, or condition returns of vested propert,. 2 In five cases, French and
Norwegian corporations were granted return of vested patents only after
promising to cancel and not reinstate licensing agreements allegedly illegal
under the antitrust laws, and to license these and future patents to American
firms on a competitive basis.9 3 In another case, return of vested copyright
and contract interests to a French organization was delayed pending the out-
come of antitrust litigation against its American licensee.9 4 And return was
completely denied in at least three instances. One claimant was denied return
of patent rights resting on contracts which were allegedly illegal under anti-
trust law and antagonistic to United States foreign policy. Return was also
91. See REP. OAP 147 (1946).
92. Use of the national interest test is reported in seven determinations described
in the Annual Reports of the Office of Alien Property. See notes 93-5 infra. When
solicited for other instances where the national interest test w.-as invoked, the Office of
Alien Property replied that the test was used in a "few other cases" which could not
be disclosed for reasons of "national security." Communication to the YALE LAw
Jouiui.L from Deputy Director, Office of Alien Property, dated March 18, 1953, on
file in Yale Law Library. However, this information is not complete; the national interest
test has probably been invoked to deny or condition returns in other instances. Inter-
handel, see p. 1229 infra, was denied return of its $100,000,000 worth of property solely
on the basis of the national interest test. Copy of Order Disallowing Claim, on file in
Yale Law Library. This claim was not included in those described in the Annual Reports
of the Office of Alien Property. And, since the property sought by Interhandel con-
sisted of stock in an American corporation and bank accounts, it is unlikely that the
denial of its claim was included in the "national security" cases mentioned in the Deputy
Director's letter, supra.
93. Societe Rlodiaceta, etc., Claims No. 6184, 6193, RP. OAP 88 (1949) ; Nordish:
Insulinlaboratorium, Claim No. 1142, id. at 75 (1949) ; Compagnies Reuines, etc., Claims
No. 26169, 40452 and Societe Anonyme, etc., Claims No. 26758, 26765, 40458, id. at 70-2
(1950) ; Elektrokemisk, etc., Claim No. 6961, id. at 71-2 (1951).
94. SACEM, Claim No. 12100, id. at 75-6 (1949).
95. Id. at 70-2 (1950). The State Department advised against return because the
patent contracts "appear to create a division of markets . . . inconsistent wvith United
States foreign policy." Order Disallowing Claim: In the Matter of Libbey-Owens-Ford
Glass Co., Claim No. 1058, p. 6 n.10 (July 18, 1950). The Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice advised against return because the patent contracts were intended
to (1) "eliminate competition"; (2) "divide territories"; (3) provide "exclusive inter-
change of patent rights"; (4) restrict "sublicensing" in an "improper" manner-which
provisions the Antitrust Division "found . . . to be illegal under the antitrust laws of
the United States." Id. at 7-S n.11.
Although Libbey-Owens-Ford is an American corporation, it was not eligible for
return under § 9(a). As a result of a corporate merger, Libbey-Owens-Ford was a
"successor-in-interest" to the corporation which had owned the patent rights at the time
of vesting.Id. at 1, 5 n.7. And § 9(a) is available only to claimants who owned the
property at the time of vesting, see cases cited in note 44 supra; or, if they are deceased,
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denied in at least two more cases for reasons of "national security.""0 Since
"classified security information" was allegedly involved in these cases, the
Custodian's order merely disallows the claim without further elaboration. 1
Unchecked administrative discretion under the Act may be abused.08 When
applied by an agency which is in the Department of Justice together with the
Antitrust Division,9" the vague 100 national interest test may effectuate poli-
cies in a biased atmosphere.101 Similarly, recommendations made by other
governmental agencies on "national interest" factors may predetermine the
Custodian's eventual decision.10 2 The claimant, on the other hand, has no
to their legal representatives. 40 STAT. 419 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Apr. § 9(d),
(g) (1946). Section 32, on the other hand, is available to successors-in-interest. 60 STAr.
50, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(a) (2) (1946).
96. Communication to the YAix LAW JOURNAL from Deputy Director, Office of Allen
Property, dated March 18, 1953, in Yale Law Library. For reasons behind the speculation
that the actual number of denials may be higher than the Office of Alien Property admits,
see note 92 supra.
97. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Deputy Director, Office of Allen
Property, dated March 18, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
98. Senator McCarran charges that some claimants are denied § 32 return in an
"arbitrary manner." 99 CoNG. Rrcm 512 (Jan. 21, 1953).
99. See note 6 supra.
100. See testimony in Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 3750, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 35, 37-8 (1945).
101. E.g., see note 95 stpra. Measures taken under the national interest test may
be immune to subsequent legal challenge since the Custodian can restrict the "rights,
privileges and obligations" of the claimant whose property is returned under § 32. 60
STAT. 50, 50 U.S.C. App. § 32(d) (1946).
The "teamwork" of the Office of Alien Property and the Antitrust Division is evi-
denced in contexts other than the national interest. The Office, with vested stockholdings
giving it control of large business enterprises, has entered consent decrees which will
bind the corporations after sale of such stockholdings to American investors. See, e-g.,
United States v. American Bosch Corp., 1948-49 Trade Cases ff 62,284 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(amended decree); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., id. ff 62,334 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
"[I]n the opinion of the [American Bosch] Corporation," some of the practices pro-
hibited in the consent decree did not violate antitrust laws. PROSPEcrus or AM iecAx
BoscH CORP. 17 (June 15, 1948). Other agreements between the Attorney General ani
vested enterprises may irrevocably commit a corporation to patent policies which the
"management of the Corporation . . .believes . . .will have an adverse [and raterial]
effect upon its future sales and profits ... ." PROSPEcrus OF ScHMUNG Cor. 8-9 (January
31, 1952).
102. "In cases where information has been received, as a result of consultive inquiries
addressed to interested officers in this Department or other federal agencies that con-
ditions exist with respect to the property claimed which in the national interest should
be removed prior to a return, the claimant has been informed .... Arrangements have
been made with the claimant in cooperation with the interested agencies to clear up these
matters prior to issuance of a determination allowing the claim and a return order."
Communication to the YALE LAW JougRAL from Deputy Director, Office of Alien
Property, dated March 18, 1953, in Yale Law Library. When asked whether return would
have been made if the claimant "did not cooperate," the Office of Alien Property replied
that "it is not appropriate to comment ... at this time" since the problem had "not yet
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absolute right to a hearing if the Government invokes the "national inter-
est."' 03 Although he may have the opportunity to attend an "informal" hear-
ing, he is not advised of the reasons for denial if "national security" is allegedly
involved130 Since Section 32 determinations are not subject to judicial re-
view, 1 5 administrative abuses in applying the national interest test will go
uncorrected. 0
Even if judicial review were available under Section 32, arbitrary dis-
crimination against wartime allies would continue. For example, an English-
man whose property was mistakenly seized as "enemy owned" can qualify
for return under both 9(a) and 32. But, a Frenchman, defined as an "enemy"
because of German occupation of France, can obtain return only under Section
32, subject to the national interest test. Return to tle Frenchman may be con-
ditioned or denied if the Antitrust Division advises the Custodian that the
vested property was or may be used illegally"1 7 That the Englishman had
or will use his vested property in the same manner, does not affect his right
to 9(a) return.
RETURN OF CORPORATE ASSETS
In addition to the disparity evidenced by the national interest test, Sections
9(a) and 32 pursue separate paths in deternining the eligibility of corporate
and shareholder claimants who seek the return of vested corporate assets.
Returns to the Corporation
Although Sections 32 and 9(a) both permit return of vested property to
corporate claimants, they employ different standards of eligibility. Section
32 bars return to (1) corporations chartered in certain specified enemy
nations, 08 and (2) all other foreign corporations which are controlled or 50
been presented to this Office." Communication to the YALE LAW JOLP-,NAL from Deputy
Director, Office of Alien Property, dated April 24, 1953, in Yale Law Library. In one
case the Custodian stated that he felt "powerless" to grant return after other Goivernment
agencies advised that return would be contrary to the national interest. Order Disallow-
ing Claim: In the Matter of Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., Claim No. 1058, p. 14 (July
18, 1950). Also see REP. OAP 88 (1948).
103. 8 CoDE FE. REGs. §§ 502.103, 502.105 (1952) ; Communication to the YAt.L LAw
JoURNAL from Director, Office of Alien Property, dated November 24, 1952, in Yale Law
Library.
104. Ibid.
105. McGrath v. Zander, 177 F2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
106. Note, 55 Yaix L.J. 836, 842 (1946) (recommending judicial review for § 32
determinations). Also see S. 34, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953) (proposing judicial remedy
for § 32 claimants) ; SEN. REP. No. 1235, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
107. See Claims cited in note 93 supra.
10S. Germany, Japan, Bulgaria, Hungary, or Rumania. But, if these corporations
are wholly owned by American citizens or corporatiuns, the property is returnable to
these shareholders. C0 STAT. 50 (1946), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 32(a) (2) (1;)
(Supp. 1952).
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percent of whose stock is owned by persons ineligible for return under other
provisions of Section 32.109 On the other hand, enemy corporations for purposes
of 9(a) are defined by the Act as those incorporated in enemy or enemy-
occupied territory, and other foreign corporations doing business there.110
Since this definition does not look behind the corporate entity,"' enemies lIeld
their American property through neutral corporations.1 12 Such corporations,
not being enemies, were statutorily eligible for return of vested property
under 9(a).
But in 1947, the Supreme Court closed this loophole by ignoring the fictional
entity of a neutral corporation. In Clark v. Uebersee Finanz--Korp., A.G.," 8
a neutral Swiss corporation, alleging that it was not within the Act's defini-
tion of an "enemy," sought 9(a) return of vested corporate property."14 The
Government contended that return was precluded by congressional extension
of the vesting power in 1941 11 to include all foreign property. So, if this
extension were to be meaningful it would apparently supersede 9(a) to the
extent that henceforth return would be restricted to American residents whose
property was mistakenly vested as foreign owned. Rejecting the Govern-
ment's argument, 116 the Supreme Court declared that the expanded vesting
109. 60 STAT. 50, 50 U.S.C. APp. § 32(a) (2) (E) (1946). But such corporations are
eligible for return if such enemy share ownership or control was acquired after March 1,
1938, as a result of enemy occupation, and was eliminated by March 8, 1946. Ibid.
110. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. § 2(a) (1946). See, e.g., Cummings v.
Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115 (1937) (enemy incorporation) ; Swiss National Insurance
Co. v. Miller, 267 U.S. 42 (1925) (doing business within enemy territory).
111. After World War I, Congress amended § 9 to pierce the corporate veil of
certain corporations. 42 STAT. 1511 (1923), 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(b) (11) (1946). But
the Supreme Court rejected the view that this legislation expanded the Act's definition
of an "enemy" corporation. Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Miller, 266 U.S. 457, 471 (1925),
reversing 54 App. D.C. 255 (1924).
Partnerships, on the other hand, cannot seek return on the grounds that the firm is it
non-enemy. Kuttner of Manila v. Sutherland, 22 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1927). Partners
must establish their individual non-enemy character under the Act to be entitled to a
§ 9(a) return proportional to their investment. Compare Schutte v. Miller, 4 F.2d 288
(D.C. Cir. 1925) (return is proportionate to partner's direct investment in enemy firm's
assets in America), with Mayer v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 229 (D. Mass. 1920), modified and
aff'd, 278 Fed. 27 (1st Cir. 1922) (return is proportionate to partner's investment in
enemy firm).
112. See Hearings before Subcommittee on Military Affairs on S. Res. 107 and
S. Res. 146, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. III, 564-73 (1945) ; Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp.,
A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 484, 485 n.3 (1947).
113. 332 U.S. 480 (1947), affirming 158 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
114. This property consisted primarily of stock, estimated to be worth $3,000,000, in
American corporations. REP. OAP 174 (1945).
115. 55 STAT. 839 (1941), 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b) (1) (1946) ; Exec. Order No. 9095,
7 FED. REG. 1971 (1942), as amended, Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 FED. Rm. 5205 (1942). For
discussion of the extension of vesting power, see Dulles, The Vesting Power of the Alien
Property Custodian, 28 CoRNELL L.Q. 245 (1943).
116. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 486 (1947). Realizing that
this argument would bar 9(a) recovery even to friendly neutrals and allies otherwise eligible
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power was not intended to "appropriate friendly or neutral assets," but only to
"reach enemy interests which masqueraded under those innocent fronts.""r The
Court preferred to interpret the 1941 amendment as expanding the Act's defini-
tion of "enemy" to include neutral corporations "tainted" by enemy owner-
ship or control."18  On remand, the "taint" doctrine was invoked to deny
return to Uebersee." 9 Although 97 percent of Uebersee's stock was nomin-
ally owned by an alleged neutral, it was for all practical purposes owned and
controlled by an enemy under an agreement with the nominal owner.
Since enemy ownership and control was almost complete in Uebcrse, the
bounds of the "taint" doctrine remain to be staked out. ° A dictum in
Uebersee suggests that the "taint doctrine under 9(a) should follow the cri-
teria set forth in Section 32.21 Section 32 prohibits the Custodian from
making any return to neutral corporations that are controlled or 50 percent
or more of whose stock is owned by ineligible persons; all other neutral cor-
porations are eligible for complete return. L In some instances such an ap-
proach will compensate enemy interests; in others it will penalize non-
for return, the Government proposed that these former owners seek just compensation
under the Tucker Act. See Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G. v. Markham, 158 F2d 313, 316
(D.C. Cir. 1946) (dissenting opinion). Limiting friendly foreigners to just compensation
or an administrative return w.as proposed to Congress. Hearings before Subcommittec
of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 50S9, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 10 (1946);
H.R. REP. No. 2389, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1946). This proposal was rejected as
contrary to the rights which "friendly foreign nationals" possessed for "25 years." Sn;.
REP. No. 1839, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1946).
117. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G., 332 U.S. 4S0, 485 (1947). However, the
Court did not cite authority, nor can any be found, that Congress intended the expanded
vesting power to reach enemy interests masquerading behind non-enemy corporations.
The only congressional explanation for the expanded vesting power was that it enabled
Government utilization of seized property. 87 CONG. Rc. 98635, 9359, 9,3J, 9Q±2, 9&t5
(1941) ; H.R. REP. No. 1507, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1941) ; Smi. R u. No. 911, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1941). However, tortured statutory construction of the Act is not
unusual. For example, see the interpretation of § 39 in Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S.
308, 315-20 (1952).
118. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G., supra note 117, at 487.
119. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G., v. Clark, 82 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1949), aff'd
191 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 343 U.S. 205 (1952).
120. Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G., 332 U.S. 4SO, 4*8 (1947). Some indica-
tion of how far the doctrine will extend may be surmised from the Court's language in
applying the "taint" doctrine to Uebersee's complaint. The Court construed Uebersees
allegations to mean: "'that the property is free of all enemy taint and particularly that
the corporations whose shares have been seized, the corporations which have a contract
in which [plaintiff] has an interest, and [plaintiff] itself, are companies in which no
enemy, ally of an enemy, nor any national of either has any interest of any kind what-
soever, and that [plaintiff] has not done business in the territory of the enemy or any
ally of an enemy." Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G., supra at 4S8.
121. Id. at 490 n.9. On remand for a trial on the merits, the district court apparently
followed this suggestion. See 82 F. Supp. 602, 605 (D.D.C. 1949).
122. 60 STAr. 50, 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 32(a) (2) (E) (1946).
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enemies. For example, complete return to a corporation not running afoul
of the 50 percent share ownership or control standards, benefits both enemy
and non-enemy shareholders. On the other hand, denial of return to a
corporation barred by these criteria would penalize non-enemy as well as
enemy shareholders.
Although the Supreme Court suggested the adoption of Section 32's criteria
for determining enemy "taint," the Court has not followed 32's policy of re-
turning either all or none of the neutral corporation's vested assets. And, on
the basis of this, Uebersee, after denying the corporation's claim for return
of all vested assets, allowed amendment of the complaint to seek a partial return
of corporate assets for the benefit of an allegedly non-enemy shareholder,
proportionate to his holdings.123 Although this case allows "tainted" corpora-
tions to protect non-enemy shareholders, the Court has left open the question
of whether a corporation with only fractional enemy ownership and no enemy
control can seek complete return.1U If 9(a)'s "taint" doctrine is to follow
Section 32, such a corporation would be eligible for complete return. 125 This
return would violate the underlying policy of the "taint" doctrine by benefiting
the few enemies who hide behind the corporate entity. Neutral corporations
with any enemy ownership should be limited to returns proportionate to non-
enemy shareholdings. And courts could condition all proportionate returns,
allowing benefits to accrue only to non-enemy shareholders.2 6
Returns to Shareholders
Non-enemy shareholders in a "tainted" neutral corporation are not depend-
ent on corporate action for proportionate return of vested assets. The Supreme
Court in Kaufman v. Soci&t6 Internationale pour Participations Industrielles
123. Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G. v. McGrath, 343 U.S. 205, 212 (1952).
124. "[W]hat part of a friendly alien corporation's property may be returned where
only a fractional enemy ownership appears [is] left undecided." Clark v. Uebersee Finanz.
Korp., A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 489 (1947).
125. In affirming Uebersee after trial on the merits, the opinion of the Supreme
Court as reported in 20 U.S.L. WEEK 4241 (U.S. Apr. 7, 1952), contained a footnote
stating that § 9(a)'s "taint" doctrine should "not go further" in denying return than §
32. Id. at 4243 n.*. For reasons unknown, this footnote did not appear in the official U.S.
Reports or the Supreme Court Reporter. The Office of the Reporter, Supreme Court
of the United States, "has no record of the prior existence or deletion of any footnote to
the opinion. . . ." Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from Reporter of Decisions,
dated April 13, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
126. Kaufman v. Socigt6, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 161 (1952). Brief for Kaufman, pp. 42-3,
Kaufman v. Socidt6, etc., supra. The "conditioned!' return may require direct distribution
of the benefits to non-enemy shareholders. American courts could not exercise control
over the foreign corporations in its foreign domicile. Transcript of Record, pp. 49, 62,
Kaufman v. Soci&t, etc., supra. And foreign courts may not enforce the trading-with-
the-enemy legislation of belligerent countries and acts taken under such legislation.
Brief for Respondent, p. 61 n.33, Uebersee Finanz-Korp., A.G. v. McGrath, 343 U.S.
205 (1952).
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et Comwerciales, S.A., 127 recognized that such shareholders have an interest
apart from that of the corporation. Here, a Swiss corporation, known as Inter-
handel, sought complete return under Section 9(a) of vested property worth
more than 100 million dollars.i The Custodian claimed that Interhandel was
not entitled to recover any of its vested property because it was tainted with
enemy control.'2 9 Kaufman, an American shareholder, admitting that the
corporation was tainted, 30 claimed the right to intervene on the theory that
he had an interest in Interhandel's vested assets which would not be adequately
protected by the corporate suit.'3 1 A divided Court upheld Kaufman's right
to intervene, stating that innocent shareholders "have an interest which
Congress has indicated should not be confiscated merely because some others
who have like interests are enemies.'
32
While Kaufman protected innocent shareholders by allowing them to inter-
vene in a corporate action for complete return, the opinion suggests still other
judicial remedies for such shareholders. Kaufian's dictum that a "tainted"
corporation can seek proportionate return for the benefit of its non-enemy
shareholders 133 was adopted in Ulebcrsee.134 But if the corporation brings
no suit for return-neither complete nor proportionate-, non-enemy share-
holders can protect their interests only by independent suit. The reasoning
implicit in Kaufman's grant of intervention, however, seems to ignore the
possibility of such suits. The Court allowed Kaufman to intervene on the
ground that a judgment against a corporation might bind him.' 35 This basis
for intervention was apparently attributable to a belief that the corporation
was the "proper" party to seek return of Kaufman's share of corporate assets.'2^
127. 343 U.S. 156 (1952), rzvershng 188 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1951), 52 COL L. REV.
799 (1952).
128. Kaufman v. Socid6t, etc., 343 U.S. 156 n.2 (1952). This property consisted of
bank accounts and more than 2,500,000 shares in General Aniline & Film, an America
corporation. Transcript of Record, pp. 2, 4, 8-15, Kaufman v. Socit6, etc., supra.
129. The government alleged that I. G. Farben, a German industrial complex, H.
Sturzenegger et Cie., a Swiss corporation, and parties unlMown, formed Interhandel, a
Swiss holding company, to conceal I. G. Farben's share ownership in General Aniline
& Film, an American corporation. The management and operations of Intrhandel were
allegedly controlled through agents, loans, and options on stock sales, and through salcs
and patent agreements. Transcript of Record, pp. 28-30, Kaufman v. Socihtl, etc., 343
U.S. 156 (1952). Also see Hearings before Sufdcommittee of the Committee oi Military
Affairs on S. Res. 107 and S. Res. 46, pt. III, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 569-71 (1945).
130. See Kaufman v. Soci6t, etc., 343 U.S. 156 (1952).
131. Id. at 158-9. See Brief for Kaufman, pp. 48-50, Kaufman v. Soci&, etc., 343
U.S. 156 (1952).
132. Kaufman v. Socikt, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 160 (19-5).
133. The Supreme Court spoke of "[C]orporate recovery... not for the benefit of all
stockholders but only for those who are nonenemies." Id. at 161.
134. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
135. Kaufman v. Soci&6t, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 162 n.4 (1952).
136. This was the argument that Kaufman had made in supptort of its right to inter-
vene under FED. R. CIv. PnoC. 24(a) (2). Brief for Kaufman, p. 48, Kaufman v. SodCdtW,
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Thus, the Court might have thought that Kaufman had no right to maintain an
independent action. But this seems unlikely in view of the Court's desire to
protect innocent shareholders. And the right of innocent shareholders to
maintain independent suits seems to follow from the Court's statement that
the language in Section 9(a), allowing the return of an "interest in" vested
property,13 7 includes a shareholder's "severable" interest in corporate assets.
1 88
Moreover, the Court, in comparing independent suits to intervention in the
Kaufnwn context, did not deny the right to institute independent actions but
merely stated that intervention was more "appropriate."' 8 9
Although Kaufman's doctrine of a shareholder's "severable" interest was
created for a shareholder in a "tainted" neutral corporation, the doctrine can
logically be extended to shareholders in other corporations which are statutorily
ineligible for return.140 Consequently, shareholders of corporations organized
or doing business in enemy territory may attempt to invoke the severability
doctrine. But the Office of Alien Property probably will not allow recovery
by such shareholders under Section 32.141 And courts may be reluctant to
extend this doctrine under 9 (a), since the Kaufman Court appeared exclusively
etc., 343 U.S. 156 (1952). The Court stated that Kaufman's allegations brought hin
"squarely within" Rule 24(a) (2). Kaufman v. Socit6, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 162 (1952).
137. 40 STAT. 419 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. §9(a) (1946). See p. 1215 supra.
138. Kaufman v. Societ6, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 160, 161 (1952). This is the first time
that a court has interpreted the word "interest" in § 9(a) in this manner. For criticism
of this interpretation, see id. at 167 (dissenting opinion); Comment, 40 CALiF. L. REv.
558, 566 (1952); Note, 52 COL. L. Rav. 799, 800 (1952).
Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Kaufman, an independent § 9(a) suit by
Kaufman was sustained over the Government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a
cause of action. Brief for Government on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 4, Kaufman
v. Socigt6, etc., 342 U.S. 847 (1951). And for a shareholder's suit subsequent to Kaufman,
see Albert v. McGrath, 104 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
139. Kaufman v. Soci6td, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 161 (1952).
140. See Kaufman v. Socit6, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 168-9 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
141. The Office of Alien Property asserts that it has "not yet had occasion to pass
upon this matter in situations like the Kaufman case." Communication to the YALE LAW
JOURNAL from Chief, Claims Branch of the Office of Alien Property, dated April 15,
1953, in Yale Law Library. Pre-Kaufman administrative determinations did not permit
non-enemy shareholders to seek proportionate return. In the Matter of Charles Engle-
hard, Claims 107, 108, FINbAL DETERmiNAToNs 48 (1946) (§ 9(a) denial of proportionate
return) ; Transcript of Record, pp. 84-5, Kaufman v. Soci~t6, etc., 343 U.S. 156 (1952)
(reporting § 32 denial of Kaufman's claim for proportionate return). The Custodian
may not feel compelled to abandon this practice since §§ 9(a) and 32 are independent
remedies. See p. 1214 supra. Moreover, the Custodian is justified in that Congress has
allowed shareholder recovery under § 32 but has restricted such recovery to a limited
category of shareholders. See note 108 supra. When asked whether the "severability"
doctrine would be applied if a future shareholder filed a claim similar to Kaufman's, the
Office replied that it could not state its views on the matter "in advance of the actual
presentation of the question." Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from the Chief,
Claims Branch of the Office of Alien Property, dated June 5, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
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concerned with protecting innocent shareholders of a neutral corporation
which, prior to the "taint" doctrine, was eligible for complete return.142
Granting proportionate returns in corporate or shareholder suits presents
problems of determining the extent and nature of such returns. Kaufnan merely
declared that "the rights of innocent stockholders to an interest in the assets
proportionate to their stock holdings must be fully protected."J4a3 But the
opinion did not suggest the method to be used in determining the proportion
of non-enemy shareholder interests in a corporation that has different classes of
stock with varying capital contributions, dividend and liquidation rights. Nor
did it indicate whether the non-enemy proportionate share ownership, when
finally determined, shall be satisfied out of the corporation's gross vested assets,
or gross vested assets minus creditors' claims.144 And no consideration wa-
given to problems of returning a share of corporate assets that are not readily
severable from the mass of vested corporate assets.
Aside from the problems of application that it may raise for the courts,
proportionate returns will plague the Government with proof problems in
shareholder suits. To obtain return, shareholders must prove that they are
non-enemies who owned shares in the neutral corporation at the date the assets
were vestedY4 i Government attempts to rebut shareholders' self-serving evi-
dence 146 concerning the date of stock ownership will be frustrated in the
frequent instances where the "tainted" corporation issued bearer shares.
4 7
In the case of registered shares, the Government will need corporate stock
transfer records. Corporate records may also be necessary to rebut share-
holders' evidence that they are not "enemies."' 14  But the Government may
be unable to obtain such records in shareholder suits. In a trial of Kaufman
142. The Court explicitly limited its holding: "Our holding is that when the govern-
ment seizes assets of a corporation organized under the laws of a nculral country, the
rights of innocent stockholders . . .must be fully protected." Kaufman v. Socitl, etc.,
343 U.S. 156, 159-60 (1952) (emphasis added).
143. See note 142 supra.
144. Comment, 40 CAUiF. L. Ray. 558, 567-3 (1953) (creditors' claims should b2
deducted). See Brief for Government, p. 35, Kaufman v. Societ6, etc., 343 U.S. 15
(1952) (recognition of the problem of creditors' priority).
145. For a discussion of the "ownership at time of vesting" requirement under
9(a), see pp. 1216-19 ,siPra.
146. See Kaufman v. Socit6, etc., 343 U.S. 156, 167 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
147. Bearer shares are a "general practice" in European corporations. Hcarhigs
before Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs on S. Res. 107 and S. Res. 46,
pt. III, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 465 (1945). Interhandel's shares were "bearer" until after
the war. Brief for SocitY, etc., on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 17, Kaufman v.
Soci6t, etc., 342 U.S. 847 (1951).
148. It has been suggested that shareholders may be enemies, not only under the
Act's criteria, see pp. 1219-22 vtpra, but solely because of their participation in activities
which tainted the corporation. Brief for Soci~t6, etc., p. 17, Kaufman v. SocietY, etc.,
343 U.S. 156 (1952).
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on the merits, the district court recently ordered dismissal of the corporation's
suit unless it produces documents requested by the Government under the
discovery provisions of the Federal Rules.149 But the court added that the
dismissal would not operate against the intervening shareholders because
they "never had possession, custody or control" over these documents.1, 0
Consequently, the defense of "no control" may thwart Government attempts
to compel production of vital corporate books in shareholder suits tinder Sec-
tion 9(a). 151
Statute of Limitations
Under the present statute of limitations, Kaufman's creation of the sever-
ability doctrine may have come too late for many otherwise eligible share-
holders. Section 33 contains the statute of limitations for Sections 9(a) and 32.162
In order to obtain return of vested property, a notice of claim must have been
filed by April 30, 1949, or within two years from the date of vesting.153 Kauf-
man, allowing returns to non-enemy shareholders of "tainted" corporations,
was handed down in 1952. Shareholders, most of whom appear to have been
previously unaware of any possibility of recovery,'" received notice of this
right to recover after the 1949 bar date of Section 33 had passed. And they
could not come within the two-years-from-vesting period of the statute of limita-
tions if their corporation's assets had been vested before 1950.15 But Section
33 stipulates that, while 9(a) suits shall not be instituted after April 30, 1949
and two years from vesting, "in computing such two years there shall be ex-
cluded any period during which there was pending a suit or claim for return
pursuant to Section 9 or 32. . . ."I" So, in the few instances where share-
holders had filed Section 32 claims for individual returns prior to Kaufman,
the statute of limitations may have been tolled long enough to permit share-
149. Socit6, etc. v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953), 62 YALE L.J. 1248.
150. Soci&6, etc. v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 448 (D.D.C. 1953).
151. For the problems involved in securing foreign evidence in United States courts,
consult Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 520-21 n.38 (1953).
152. 60 STAT. 925 (1946), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 33 (Supp. 1952).
153. Ibid. Kroll v. McGrath, 91 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1950).
154. Only three shareholder suits, other than Kaufman's, were apparently pending
at the time the opinion was handed down. See Government's Brief on Certiorari, p. 15
n.10, Kaufman v. Socit6, etc., 342 U.S. 847 (1951).
155. Approximately $415,000,000, or more than 80 percent of the $512,000,000
evaluated property vested under the Act, was vested before June 30, 1949. See REP. OAP
Table 4, 11 (1949) ; id. at 2 (1951). And, 47,044 out of 47,410 patents and patentable
interests were vested before June 30, 1949. See Table 23, REP. OAP 47 (1949) ; Table 22, id.
at 44 (1951).
156. 62 STAr. 1218 (1948), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 33 (Supp. 1952); First Nat. Bank of
Portland v. McGrath, 97 F. Supp. 77 (D. Ore. 1951).
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holder suits. 157 However, many shareholders did not file a Section 32 claim
and will be barred by the statute of limitations 15 unless they can take advant-
age of claims timely filed by their corporations. If the corporation has a Section
9(a) suit pending, shareholders' intervention will not be barred by the statute
of limitations.159 If no corporate suit is pending, a shareholder should be able
to rely on previous 9(a) or 32 corporate action to toll the statute of limitations
for his own Section 9(a) suit. In providing that the statute will be tolled
by "a suit or claim for return pursuant to Section 9 or 32 ... ,"c' Section
33 allows suits or claims to toll the statute of limitations for subsequent
9(a) action by the same claimant. 161 It should also be interpreted to extend
the limitations period for shareholder actions subsequent to corporate claims
or suit.
CONCLUSION
The major deficiencies in the Trading with the Enemy Act may be traced
to its ad hoc development. Conceived in the atmosphere of war and for war-
157. For the statute of limitations to be tolled, the shareholder's § 32 claim has to
be filed within two years after the property was vested. Pass v. 'McGrath, 192 F2d 415
(D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. dcnied, 342 U.S. 910 (1952). If the § 32 claim is so filed, the
limitations period will not bar his 9(a) action for at least as long as his claim remains
pending. First Nat. Bank of Portland v. McGrath, supra note 156. And after the claim
is determined the shareholder may get an additional period of time equal to the difference
in time between the filing of his § 32 claim and the end of his two year limitations period.
This possible interpretation is illustrated by Kaufman's independent 9(a) suit, Kaufman
v. McGrath, Civil No. 56-246, S.D.N.Y. (1950). Kaufman's § 32 claim :as pending at
a date more than two years after vesting; his 9(a) suit was commenced after this claim
iwas finally denied, but before the above-mentioned time differential had elapsed. The
Government did not attempt to bar Kaufman under the statute of limitations. Communica-
tion to the Y-ta L.W JOURN .l from the Chief, Claims Branch of the Office of Alien
Property, dated April 15, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
159. The number of shareholders who filed the § 32 claims necessary to toll the
statute of limitations may be less than those who instituted § 9(a) suits. See note 154
supra. Although 9,371 claims were pending as of June 30, 1952, see note 162 in ra, the
Office of Alien Property asserts that the "Kaufman situation" has not been repeated.
Communication to the YAI.E LAw JOVRXAL from Chief, Claims Branch of the Office of
Alien Property, dated June 5, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
159. 4 Moom, Fnmmkn PR.%cTicE 24.13[2] (2d ed. 1950).
160. 62 ST.T. 1218 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 33 (Supp. 1952).
161. The Senate added that a suit as well as a claim would toll the statute of
limitations for a subsequent § 9(a) suit. Neither the House of Representative nor the
Alien Property Custodian understood why this addition was made. The Custodian was
quite sure, however, that the Senate's addition could not be regarded as "implying that
there is judicial review under § 32" nor as an attempt to "interfere with" the doctrine Uf
res judicata in § 9(a) suits." 92 CONG. Rrc. 10436 (1946). Even the Custodian's re-
strictive interpretation of § 33's tolling feature should not preclude a claimant w~hu
discontinues his 9(a) suit from commencing it anew, taking advantage of the priur suit
in tolling the statute of limitations. For the amount of time which the statute of limitationh
can be tolled, see note 157 supra.
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time purposes, the Act's return procedures are uncoordinated efforts to rectify
erroneous seizures and facilitate postwar readjustments. 10 2 Non-reviewable
Section 32 proceedings are subject to possible abuses of discretion. And
judicial determinations under Section 9(a) suffer from vague criteria. To
compensate for legislative ambiguity and failure to revise the Act to meet
present-day requirements, courts have been compelled to create judge-made
law.163 The "taint" and "severability" doctrines, and the manipulation of
"residency" and "proprietary interest" concepts exemplify judicial attempts
to effectuate the policy of the Act. Finally, discrimination is inherent in the
present dual return procedures employing different criteria of eligibility for
comparable former owners.
A complete revision of the Act's return procedures is preferable to a piece-
meal approach.16 4 The discrimination involved in two return methods can be
erased by establishing a single set of criteria for return applicable to all claim-
ants. These criteria should express congressional approval or disapproval of
such judicially created doctrines as "taint" and "severability." At the same
time, the statute of limitations could be brought into alignment with the
substantive rights which Congress created for the divested former owner or
shareholder.16 5
The most feasible method of applying a single set of criteria would be a
unified administrative-judicial return procedure. The claimant could be re-
quired to exhaust an initial administrative remedy. And, if administrative
return is denied, the claimant should be assured of judicial review to check
any possible abuse of discretion. However, if Congress wishes to retain the
national interest test, the application of the test by the administrative agency
should not be reviewable by the courts. Courts are inappropriate forums
162. Termination of the program is far from realization. A recent Senate Investiga-
tion reveals that the 9,371 § 32 claims which were then pending will take "approximately
20 additional years to process." Interim Rep., supra note 18, at 7, 8.
163. for differing views on the desirability of judicial innovation, comparc Bishop,
Judicial Construction of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 62 HARy. L. REv. 721, 759
(1949) (preferring judicial interpretation to legislative repair, but with more judicial
uniformity in interpretation), with Josephberg v. Markham, 152 F. 2d 644, 650 (2d Cir.
1945) (dissenting opinion) (unless courts are willing to declare the Act invalid, they are
not at liberty to ignore it by judging each case on its equities).
164. For bills pending in Congress proposing amendments to the Act, see S. 28, 34,
146, 151, 155, 249, 373; H.R. 535, 2681, 3174, 3303, 3594, 3636, 3978, 4080, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1953). See also note 28 snpra.
165. In addition to the shareholder's problem with the statute of limitations, see
pp. 1232-3 supra, the limitations period is apparently unfair to many other former
owners. The Office of Alien Property reportedly stated that approximately 1,200 claims
were filed and could not be considered. Letter to Senator Everett M. Dirksen, from
Senator Lester C. Hunt, Feb. 6, 1953, copy on file in Yale Law Library. Although the
statute of limitations has been amended several times, 61 STAT. 786 (1947), 62 STAT. 1218
(1948), the need for a further extension is still felt in Congress. See, e.g., S. 373, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 13, 1953).
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for applying such an economic and political standard. But if a claim for return
is denied or conditioned solely on the basis of the national interest test, the
otherwise eligible claimant should receive compensation. Judicial review,
without inquiring into the validity of the test's application, should e'amine
the adequacy of the compensation.
Until a major revision of the Act's return procedures is undertaken, the
economic warfare that was the Act's genesis will continue to plague the nation
with peacetime repercussions which need not and should not be tolerated.
